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Abstract: Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are online tools designed to help 
citizens decide how to vote. They typically offer their users a representation of what is 
at stake in an election by matching user preferences on issues with those of parties or 
candidates. While the use of VAAs has boomed in recent years in both established 
and new democracies, this new phenomenon in the electoral landscape has received 
little attention from political theorists. The current academic debate is focused on 
epistemic aspects of the question how a VAA can adequately represent electoral 
politics. We argue that conceptual and normative presuppositions at play in the 
background of the tool are at least as important. Even a well-developed VAA does not 
simply reflect what is at stake in the election by neutrally passing along information. 
Rather, it structures political information in a way that is informed by the developers’ 
presuppositions. Yet these presuppositions remain hidden if we interpret the tool as a 
mirror that offers the user a reflection of herself situated within the political landscape. 
VAAs should therefore be understood as electoral dioramas, staged according to a 












The use of ‘Voting Advice Applications’ (VAAs) is booming in electoral democracies 
throughout the world. These online tools aim to help citizens decide how to vote. 
Examples are the international Vote Compass, the Dutch StemWijzer, the German 
Wahl-o-Mat, the Swiss Smartvote, and the EU Profiler. In nearly all European 
countries one or more VAAs are active around election time, and versions have been 
developed for new electoral systems such as Egypt and Tunisia. In Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland, where they have so far been the most popular, 20 to 40 
percent of the electorate have used one or another VAA in recent elections (Garzia 
and Marschall 2012). VAAs try to help users cast their ballot more competently than 
they would do otherwise, without overtaxing their time, attention, and cognitive 
abilities. They generally do so by mapping the preferences of users onto the policy 
positions of parties participating in an election, reducing the costs of obtaining and 
analyzing political information (Garzia 2010). In other words, VAAs function as a 
matchmaker between parties or candidates and the electorate (Fossen and Anderson 
2014; Wagner and Ruusuvirta 2012). At first sight, this ‘matching model’ generates a 
win-win situation: experts involved in VAA design leverage the voting competence of 
users, thereby improving the quality of the electoral process.  
Can VAAs deliver on this promise? The increasing prominence of VAAs in the 
electoral landscape has brought them under the scrutiny of political scientists. There is 
a burgeoning literature that focuses on empirical effects that VAAs have on the 
behavior of voters, on the one hand (Gemenis and Rosema 2014; Marschall and 
Schmidt 2010; Walgrave, van Aelst, and Nuytemans 2008; Wall, Krouwel, and 
Vitiello 2014), and on methodological concerns about their design on the other 
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(Gemenis 2013; Louwerse and Rosema 2014; Walgrave, Nuytemans, and Pepermans 
2009).1 Yet an assessment of the contribution that VAAs make to democracy also 
crucially depends on normative and conceptual issues, and these have received less 
attention so far (Anderson and Fossen 2014; Fossen and Anderson 2014). In this 
paper, we approach VAAs from a philosophical perspective, with the aim of 
illuminating these tools not in terms of their behavioral effects, but in terms of the 
meanings they generate and propagate. More specifically, we ask: how should we 
interpret the role of VAAs in the electoral process and what is the status of their 
advice?2  
To get a handle on these questions, we start out by articulating a problem that any 
VAA that tries to enhance voter competence will have to address: what we call the 
problem of representation. We use the concept of representation here not to refer to 
the relation of some political actors standing or acting for others (e.g. the elected and 
the electorate). Democratic politics does not just involve the representation of the 
people by their rulers, but also the representation of the rulers to the people.3 We are 
concerned here with the representation that VAAs offer of certain aspects of the 
electoral process to the user. In order to do their work, VAAs must reduce the 
complex reality of electoral politics to manageable proportions and present this to the 
user in an easily accessible and understandable way. They present the user with a 
picture, or a representation, of the electoral landscape. As we will explain, the 
problem of representation for VAAs, in its most general form, concerns the proper 
relation between the representation offered by the VAA and the reality of a political 
election. What are the relevant aspects of the election that a VAA should capture, and 
how can this be done in a way that gives voters a good grip on what the election is 
about?  
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Focusing on this central issue enables us to articulate two competing 
interpretations of the role of VAAs in the electoral process, according to two different 
ways of understanding and addressing the problem of representation. On the first view, 
the application offers the user, as it were, a look in the mirror, in which she sees a 
reflection of herself as situated within the political landscape. The basic idea behind 
this picture is that the tool enhances the user’s competence to vote by matching her 
preferences with objective information about what is on offer in the election. On this 
interpretation, the normative force of the outcome of the application, for a user, 
derives solely from her own preferences. The tool itself remains normatively neutral: 
it merely provides information, like a clear and undistorted mirror. The problem of 
representation appears here as an essentially epistemological problem: how to give 
users correct information about what is at stake. It can in principle be resolved, 
provided bias is avoided and methodological problems are satisfactorily addressed.  
On the second interpretation, VAAs are not mirrors of electoral politics, but 
dioramas, like, for instance, a three-dimensional historical miniature or a shoebox 
theater. From this perspective, a VAA does not offer a reflection but a constructed 
representation of one aspect of what is at stake in an election. The crucial contrast 
with a mirror is that everything in a diorama is staged according to the presenter’s 
narrative or artistic vision, whereas a mirror simply reflects a structure that is already 
found in the world. In a VAA, this comes out in the fact that elements in the 
“foreground” of the tool—the user’s policy preferences, parties’ positions, and so 
on—only belong together against the backdrop of a specific interpretation of the 
electoral process and the significance of the act of voting. This “picture of politics” in 
the background, as we will call it, tends to remain implicit in most VAAs, but it 
structures the political information through and through. The crucial implication of 
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this interpretation is that VAAs do, implicitly, take a political stance: they adopt and 
propagate a fairly specific and contestable view of what an election is about. The 
normative force of the tool therefore does not derive solely from the user’s policy-
preferences. It depends also on a normatively laden picture of politics as about the 
aggregation of policy-preferences. The problem of representation now appears not as 
a merely epistemic, but a political issue, in which the meaning of the act of voting and 
the legitimacy of the electoral process are at stake.  
By analyzing two ways of framing the results of VAAs we show that VAA-
construction inevitably brings in political presuppositions on the part of developers. 
Such political choices are easy to see if we understand a VAA as a diorama, but they 
tend to remain hidden if we see it as a mirror. The upshot of this argument is that 
conceptual and normative aspects of VAAs deserve more scrutiny than they are 
currently receiving. Moreover, we suggest that to treat the VAA as mirroring what is 
at stake in the election potentially threatens to undercut its aim of enhancing voting 
competence. To interpret the VAA as a mirror is to treat the problem of representation 
as an issue of measurement, rather than political judgment. If users cannot see the 
contestable picture of politics presented in the VAA as a contestable representation of 
politics, then they are out of tune, in this sense, with politics. And that, of course, 
cannot be understood as a gain in citizen competence.  
 
2. Introducing VAAs: foreground and background  
 
To begin, let us explain what VAAs do in a bit more detail, and introduce our notions 
of their foreground and background. Generally, VAAs aim to address problems that 
stem from the complexity of contemporary electoral politics and the dynamics of 
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media-driven election campaigns.4 It is difficult for voters to cut through the overflow 
of (dis)information and see what is really at stake (de Graaf and Scheltens 2011). As 
the real differences between parties become unclear to citizens, so do the reasons for 
voting in the first place. By becoming more informed about actual party positions, 
voters might also become more inclined to go out and vote (Fivaz and Nadig 2010; 
Marschall 2008; Marschall and Schmidt 2010). Prominent VAAs such as Smartvote, 
Wahl-O-Mat, Vote Compass, and StemWijzer therefore try to help users vote by 
matching their preferences on policy-issues to party positions encoded in the tool.  
While there is a large variety of different VAA-implementations, the typical setup 
of current VAAs is simple. An opening screen invites users in by soliciting them to 
test their preferences or promising to find out their position in the political landscape. 
If persuaded to use the tool, the user is presented with a series of statements about 
policy-issues at stake in the election and asked for a response. Finally, the outcome of 
the test is presented, which ranks the parties in terms of their distance from or 
agreement with the user and indicates the closest match. Often, the VAA offers the 
users options to customize and analyze the output, for example by selecting issues or 
themes that they deem important, or by including or excluding parties or candidates.  
 
[Figure 1: Statement screen from EU Profiler 2009] 
[Figure 2: Result screen from EU Profiler 2009 (German parties)] 
[Figure 3: Result screen from Wahl-O-Mat 2009] 
 
So on the face of it, what the VAA does is straightforward: it matches the user’s 
preferences on a set of issues to the positions of parties or candidates on those issues, 
which are encoded in the tool. The application aims to be a platform that brings 
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together voters’ preferences and the policy-positions of political parties about the 
crucial issues at stake. But we need to unpack what goes on here a bit more. It helps 
to distinguish between the foreground and background of the tool.  
In the foreground, we find elements that are immediately present and visible in the 
tool, such as the set of statements; the user’s responses; the responses of political 
parties; and the result, either in terms of levels of (dis)agreement or a “political 
landscape” in which user and parties are positioned with respect to each other (see the 
screenshots above). These elements hang together in a particular way, structured by 
the way in which the VAA is constructed and presented, and they refer to elements in 
the electoral reality. Three elements are crucial. First, users’ choices from the 
response-categories are supposed to capture their policy-preferences as voters. Second, 
the positions of parties (or candidates) encoded in the tool are supposed to capture 
their policy-proposals on issues. Third, the set of statements is supposed to capture the 
salient issues at stake in the election or the underlying dimensions of ideological 
competition. Under the hood, these three crucial elements are combined by an 
algorithm that calculates a result or voting-advice – including a ‘best match’ and 
runners up.  
The elements of the VAA encountered in the foreground belong together on the 
basis of certain presuppositions about the point of the election and the importance of 
casting one’s ballot. These basic presuppositions about the electoral process and the 
user as voter constitute the VAA’s conceptual background. The conceptual 
background of a VAA includes what we will call a specific “picture of politics,” i.e. a 
broad view of what an election is and what it is about (van den Brink 2012). As is 
frequently noted, VAAs are often set up to help users with issue voting, as is apparent 
from the central role of issue statements in the tool (Fossen and Anderson 2014; 
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Garzia and Marschall 2012; Wagner and Ruusuvirta 2012). In some cases, the issues 
are taken as indicators of underlying ideological dimensions that structure the political 
arena (Otjes and Louwerse 2014). Either way, the VAA typically expects citizens to 
have fairly clear and stable policy preferences, which it asks them to express. What 
they lack is sufficient knowledge of the policy programs of political parties or 
candidates running in an election. So parties and candidates are seen as bearers of 
competing policy-programs, striving to realize these through competitive elections; 
voters are construed as vats of policy-preferences to be tapped. In light of this picture, 
what’s ultimately at stake in the election is the transformation of preferences into 
policy-outcomes. 
Recently, Fossen and Anderson (2014) have shown that this picture of politics is 
contested in democratic theory. It fits neatly with the normative model of democracy 
offered by the social choice approach, in which the electoral process is essentially a 
method of aggregating given preferences, in order that public policy can reflect them 
as closely as possible (e.g. Elster 1997; Golder and Stramski 2010). But alternative 
theories of democracy offer quite different views of the electoral process. Deliberative 
democrats, for example, typically hold that the democratic process is primarily about 
transforming preferences, rather than just aggregating them (Bohman and Rehg 1997; 
Goodin 2008). On their view, individual preferences are a suitable guide to policy- 
and lawmaking only if they are rational or well considered. Whereas Fossen and 
Anderson have focused on making explicit the normative presuppositions of VAAs 
and contrasting them with alternative perspectives from democratic theory, our aim in 
the present paper is to think through the implications of the presence of this 
background picture for how we should understand the relation between the 




3. The problem of representation in VAAs: mirrors or dioramas?   
 
Since VAAs claim to help users function better in the real world of an election, a 
VAA clearly purports to be an adequate representation of the actual reality of 
electoral politics. If the VAA is to achieve this, the ‘picture’ it paints and the 
information it provides must correspond accurately, to some extent, with real politics. 
Yet, at the same time, the representation should not be too much like reality in all its 
aspects, otherwise it would reproduce the problems the VAA is trying to address 
(complexity, information overload, etc.). In short, in order to be a successful tool the 
VAA must aim to offer an adequate representation of the reality of electoral politics 
under a certain aspect, to the exclusion of other aspects.  
This representational character of VAAs raises an important question concerning 
the relation between the VAA’s picture and the reality of electoral politics—what 
we’ll call the problem of representation: What are the relevant aspects of politics that 
a VAA should capture, and how can this be done adequately, in a way that makes it as 
good as real? In other words, how should we understand the connection between the 
real world of an election, and the representation of it in a VAA? The way in which 
this question is addressed is crucial for an assessment of whether and how VAAs can 
enhance their users’ grip on an election. And it is precisely at this point that the 
difference between our interpretations of a VAA as either a mirror or diorama 
becomes salient.  
Let’s approach the question first from an epistemological perspective, which 
focuses on the relation between knowledge-claims and the world. Traditionally, this 
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relation has been understood in terms of correspondence between knowledge and the 
facts; a view which Richard Rorty famously captured with the image of a “mirror of 
nature” (Rorty 1979). From an epistemological point of view, the crux of the problem 
of representation in VAAs is whether and how the information presented to the user 
can correspond to reality. So the salient questions about VAAs are how to accurately 
capture the preferences of users and the positions of parties, and how to match these 
in an unbiased way. How can a careful selection of issues and formulation of 
statements be achieved, while remaining neutral with respect to parties (Van Camp, 
Lefevere, and Walgrave 2014)? How should user preferences be measured (Baka, 
Figgou, and Triga 2012)? How can party-positions on these issues be coded in a way 
that reflects what the party really stands for (Gemenis 2013; Trechsel and Mair 2011; 
Wagner and Ruusuvirta 2012)? How can the result or voting advice be calculated in a 
fair and unbiased way (Louwerse and Rosema 2014; Mendez 2012a)? And what is the 
best way to present the results (Louwerse and Rosema 2014; Otjes and Louwerse 
2014)?  
These kinds of epistemological and methodological questions are important and 
will arise for any VAA. Now, suppose for the moment that we can satisfactorily 
address these concerns. Would that constitute a resolution of the problem of 
representation? Would we then have a fully satisfactory answer to the question of how 
a VAA’s picture of politics relates to the stubborn reality of an election campaign? If 
we understand the problem in terms of correspondence to reality, it seems that it 
would.  
But the image of a VAA as a mirror of electoral politics has its limitations. 
Sensible though the epistemic concerns about VAAs are, treating them as exhausting 
the problem of representation in this sense is problematic. It addresses the problem of 
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representation only at the level of what we have called the foreground of the device, 
by explaining how statements can reflect issues in the election, how user preferences 
are more or less accurately captured, how party positions are encoded, etc. But this 
leaves the background picture of politics unquestioned. The underlying picture of 
politics as policy-making and electoral politics as match-making between voters’ 
preferences and policy proposals is not thematized as just one possible picture of what 
politics is about – and hence taken for granted. The image of the VAA as a mirror 
prevents us from seeing that this conceptual background is in play at all, because it 
suggests that the relation of the information presented in the tool to reality is simply 
one of correspondence.  
It is clear, then, that the epistemological interpretation of the problem of 
representation is incomplete. It needs to be supplemented with a political 
interpretation of the problem of representation, which brings out the contested 
character of the political presuppositions that underlie VAAs. We propose, therefore, 
to replace the image of the VAA as a mirror with that of a diorama, such as a three-
dimensional historical miniature or a shoebox theater. This interpretation brings into 
view the stage setting that goes on in the background, which structures the foreground 
elements of the presentation. Anyone who sees a reconstruction of a famous battle, for 
example will easily recognize that what is presented is not straightforwardly a 
reflection of what happened, but depends on the presenter’s take on the event.  
The implication of this view is that even the best answers to epistemic and 
methodological issues in VAA construction would not constitute a full resolution of 
the problem of representation. Epistemological concerns have their place, of course. 
But the expert’s job is not simply to perfect the optical properties of the instrument 
and perhaps direct the angle of view, as if holding up a mirror. Rather, the developer 
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takes a more active part in structuring the contents of the image, by propagating a 
specific interpretation of the electoral landscape. Below, we argue this point in more 
detail by analyzing two different ways of presenting the results of a VAA. But first, it 
is worth considering briefly how these interpretations come up in the debate.    
 
4. Mirrors and dioramas in the current debate 
Our main aim is to make explicit the epistemological and the political view of 
representation in VAAs as possible interpretations for further discussion, thereby 
extending our analytical toolkit for understanding these devices. For this purpose it is 
less important to attribute these views to anyone in particular. It is not always clear 
which view developers and researchers hold since these issues are not usually 
explicitly discussed. Still, there are reasons for thinking that both are to some extent 
implicitly at work in the debate.  
First, the epistemic view of the problem is implicit in claims to objectivity made by 
some VAAs, such as the EU Profiler (like various implementations of Vote Compass), 
which claims to give users “an unobstructed view of the European political landscape, 
and their place within it” (“EU Profiler Description and Methodology” 2009, 4). This 
is clear also in how it presents the user with its results: “This is your place in the 
political landscape.” Such a framing of the results evokes a view of the VAA as an 
optical instrument that matches subjective preferences of the user with normatively 
neutral, objective information. Similar claims can be found in VAA research. For 
example, the optical metaphor comes up explicitly in a recent article that describes the 
tools as offering “a look into the mirror” which “reveals to the user the structure of 
party competition in light of her own preferences” (Dinas, Trechsel, and Vassil 2014, 
291).  
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Second, this epistemic interpretation of the problem fits well with the strongly 
methodological focus of much of the academic debate, which aims at improving the 
accuracy of the match provided by VAAs. For example, in a discussion of whether 
political scientists should be held accountable for VAAs, Ladner, Felder, and Fivaz 
argue for the importance of standards of quality and transparency in VAAs (Ladner, 
Felder, and Fivaz 2010). They acknowledge that there is no uniquely correct way of 
setting up a VAA, and that users should therefore have a choice among multiple 
VAAs with different setups. Their discussion focuses on the dangers of insufficient 
scientific quality, as well as bias and intentional manipulation (ibid., 117, 118). These 
points are clearly important. But they do not address the conceptual and normative 
presuppositions of VAAs. Indeed, they suggest that the output of VAAs that meet 
basic scientific standards could be directly linked to electronic ballot boxes (ibid., 
123). This gives the impression that the basic choices involved in VAA design—and 
hence the responsibilities of developers—are merely epistemic, not political.  
On the other hand, however, VAA developers are typically self-consciously 
modest in their claims. Some argue, for instance, that a VAA should shy away from 
presenting a voting “advice” or “recommendation” (for instance, Wahl-O-Mat 2009 
and Vote Compass).5 More to the point, some developers stress the necessarily 
limited character of their tool, making explicit that it leaves out potentially pertinent 
aspects. For instance, the makers of the Belgian “Do the Vote Test” argue:  
“VAA designers make inevitably subjective choices leading to different results. [...] The 
‘advice’ to vote for a certain party should therefore better be interpreted as a party profile 
(consisting out of several parties on top of a list) based on a certain (important) aspect of 
a voter's world.” (Nuytemans, Walgrave, and Deschouwer 2010, 142 emphasis added)  
In a similar vein, a developer of “Choose4Greece” states:  
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“Our aim is to try to convey to the user, at least subtly, that there is no ‘single’ scientific 
result. But more crucial even than this is the fact that voters are motivated by very 
different concerns that cannot, by definition, be captured by a matching algorithm. [...] But 
the experience [of using the tool] may provide that user with an alternative glimpse of the 
policy landscape – one that goes beyond the simple soundbites that are peddled by the 
mainstream media.” (Mendez 2012b)  
One could go one step further and add that voters may not only as a matter of fact 
have different motivations than those captured by the VAA; more strongly, they 
might have good reasons for taking into consideration aspects that are not included in 
the tool. Still, these remarks convey a sense of the specificity and the limits of the 
picture of politics presented by VAAs, acknowledging that political presuppositions 
come into play in the focus on policy-issues and the selection of statements. Still, so 
far, relatively little attention has been paid to articulating, criticizing, and justifying 
the picture of politics in light of which this aspect looks so important.  
 
5. Staging electoral dioramas: What is at stake in an election? 
 
To make this point more concrete, in this section we take a closer look at a critical 
aspect of how electoral dioramas are staged: the presentation of the results. We’ll 
discuss two different ways of framing the results: with a list of levels of agreement 
between user and parties on a set of issues, or with a low-dimensional spatial model 
of politics. Typically VAAs use at least one of these two ways of framing their output, 
though some combine multiple modes of presentation.6 The choice between these 
ways of structuring and presenting information is an important step in staging the 
electoral diorama, because it affects the meaning of the result. Our concern in this 
section is to show that for both approaches, addressing the problem of representation 
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involves political judgment rather than just measurement, and hence, a contestable 
stance within the political landscape on the part of the developers.7 So irrespective of 
the way in which the results are presented, the VAA should be seen as a diorama 
rather than a mirror of the political landscape.  
If you compare the result screens of EU Profiler and Wahl-O-Mat in figures 2 and 
3, you’ll see that the latter provides a list of parties ranked according to a count of the 
number of (dis)agreements with the user. The former presents a quite different picture, 
in which parties and user are situated within a two-dimensional space. The difference 
affects not only the visual presentation of the result, but also the underlying methods 
of calculation.8 More important, for our purposes, is that there is a significant 
conceptual difference between the claim that a VAA makes by using a low-
dimensional spatial model or a list-approach. In both cases the VAA aims to match 
voters and parties by providing information on policy positions, but the information 
provided is of a different nature. A list of levels of agreement only compares 
standpoints on a given set of issues; the claim made here is that you agree or disagree 
with particular parties on X number of issues from the set. In contrast, spatial 
representations purport to reveal something ‘deeper’ than just a number of issues on 
which user and parties agree or disagree. When the responses to statements are scaled 
on a set of dimensions and represented in a unified space, the tool aims to reveal 
something underlying users’ immediate preferences on issues, namely positions on 
ideological dimensions which structure these preferences (Benoit and Laver 2006). A 
spatial model thus claims to reveal the deeper dimensional structure of political space, 
whereas a list merely reveals levels of agreement on a limited set of issues.  
Our point is easiest to see in the case of list-based VAAs. As we mentioned, these 
lists represent levels of (dis)agreement between the user and parties or candidates on a 
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set of statements. The selection of issues and formulation of statements are crucial in 
constructing the VAA. If it is to be of help to the user at all in deciding how to vote, 
then, clearly, these statements are supposed to bear on the election: they must 
represent adequately at least an aspect of what is at stake. Moreover, insofar as the 
output ranking of parties or candidates is supposed to count as a voting advice or ‘best 
match’ for the user, this claim is even stronger: the set of issues then is supposed to 
represent adequately what is most important or even essential in the election. So the 
problem of representation can be articulated here by posing three questions. First, 
what justifies the claim that what is at stake are issues, rather than other 
considerations (such as leadership quality, political style, past performance, etc.)? 
Second, why is this particular set of issues representative of the issues at stake, rather 
than some other set? And third, how can responses to simple statements adequately 
represent positions on complex issues?  
It should now be quite clear that the problem cannot be seen as merely 
epistemological. The third question seems most apt for a methodological solution, and 
indeed developers and critics pay a lot of attention to the formulation and framing of 
statements and responses (though the extent to which they succeed remains a topic of 
discussion). The selection of issues also receives particular care from developers, 
because it is clear that there is potential for steering effects and bias here. Including or 
excluding an issue that is important to a particular party, and framing it one way or 
another, is likely to affect the number of favorable recommendations the VAA 
generates for that party. Developers therefore typically make an effort to find a 
balanced and carefully formulated set of statements that differentiates between the 
parties on offer without biasing the result toward some of them. And they often offer 
users the option of tweaking the results by adding ‘weights’ to issues they find 
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important or discarding those they don’t (it is after all the user’s preferences, not the 
expert’s, that are allowed to inform the result). This is like enabling the viewer to 
influence the presentation in a shoebox theater by adjusting sliders sticking from the 
sides of the box.  
Still, there are two reasons for thinking that the problem of representation on this 
point cannot be fully resolved. First, recent research shows that the effects of 
statement selection on the outcome of the tool are considerable and systematic 
(Walgrave, Nuytemans, and Pepermans 2009; Lefevere and Walgrave 2014). It seems 
therefore that no completely neutral or objective selection is possible.  
Second, even if a set of statements could be made to ‘reflect’ certain issues 
accurately and without biasing one party over another, the question remains: 
reflecting what? The set of issues is supposed to represent what is at stake in public 
debate or the electoral campaign. But the question of what is at stake is itself a 
political question and subject to political contestation. This was vividly brought out 
by the “stemijzer” VAA developed by an anarchist collective to counter StemWijzer 
in the Dutch national elections of 2006, which tried to put issues on the agenda that 
were not addressed in mainstream VAAs, such as NATO membership and free public 
transport (“Eurodusnie Presenteert Stemijzer” 2006). (“Stemijzer” roughly translates 
as “voting crowbar” and is a play on “StemWijzer”, which means both “voting guide” 
and an exhortation to “vote more wisely!”) In short, which issues are representative of 
what is at stake in an election is at least in part a normative question, and developers 
inevitably take stances on this point.  
The problem goes even deeper if we take the first question into consideration: what 
justifies the nearly exclusive focus on policy-issues in this kind of matching-VAA, to 
the exclusion of other aspects? The claim that the election is about issues is a 
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normative claim, one that (as we’ve said before) makes sense in light of a specific, but 
contestable picture of politics as about transforming preferences into policies, to the 
exclusion of other aspects.  
When a VAA uses a low-dimensional spatial model of politics, a similar point 
holds, although here the issue is a bit more complex. Spatial metaphors are ubiquitous 
in politics, for instance in the familiar left-right distinction. Spatial models of politics 
are a way of representing the relative positions of political actors on underlying 
conceptual dimensions, providing a map of political space (Benoit and Laver 2012). 
Differences in position represent differences in ideology that supposedly underlie 
observed policy-preferences. Such models are widely used in political science in 
order to systematically describe and explain political phenomena, in particular voting 
behavior and party competition (Benoit and Laver 2006; Schofield 2008). The use of 
such models in VAAs can therefore appear to be an application of political scientists’ 
expertise for practical purposes—and it is presented as such, for instance, by Vote 
Compass.  
Because the use of these tools is familiar from political science, it is particularly 
tempting to interpret VAAs that use them as mirrors of electoral reality rather than 
dioramas, and the problem of representation as an epistemic rather than political 
problem. The tool purports to simply reflect the landscape and the user as they are: 
“This is your position in the political landscape” (EU Profiler 2009). From the way it 
presents itself, it does not seem that there is an active role for the tool itself in 
structuring or (co-)constituting this landscape. Yet this interpretation is misleading, 
because it hides from view the way in which these representations are structured by 
political presuppositions in the background.  
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Concerning the use of spatial models in a VAA, the problem of representation 
shows up in the following form: What is the number and content of the salient axes of 
political contestation in an election? How many dimensions are needed to adequately 
represent what is at stake in an election; how should they be understood; and how do 
specific issues fit on these dimensions? Choices the developers make on these points 
clearly affect the structure of the political landscape presented to the user.  
For political scientists, who typically use spatial models to describe or explain a 
particular aspect of electoral politics, the adequacy of a dimensional representation is 
normally understood in terms of correspondence with the data.9 A particular spatial 
model is warranted insofar as it mirrors the dimensions of electoral competition in a 
particular election, that is, insofar as it accurately corresponds to what is at stake in 
the election, understood in terms of the observed behavior of the actors.10  
However, for the purposes of a VAA, the use of a particular spatial model cannot 
be sufficiently justified just by pointing to its correspondence to observed behavior. 
(And by the same token, pace Otjes and Louwerse (2014), the lack of such 
correspondence does not by itself constitute a compelling criticism of a VAA.) The 
reason is that a disengaged scientist and a political advisor have quite different roles. 
Correspondingly, there is an important difference between the function of a spatial 
model in a VAA and in a scientific analysis. When used for descriptive or explanatory 
purposes, the model does not aim to help individuals take a stance within the political 
space that it describes. It is constructed strictly from an observer’s third-person 
perspective. In contrast, a VAA is intended to help users situate themselves within the 
space it presents. The developer thereby addresses the user, adopting a second-
personal standpoint toward him or her as a voter. This shift in posture is often 
overlooked, but it is important because the question of what an election is about (the 
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dimensionality of political space), when interpreted for purposes of practical decision-
making, is essentially a normative, political question (“It’s the economy, stupid!”). If 
that is the case, then representing the landscape to voters in one way or another in a 
VAA constitutes a political intervention. (On the contested character of the 
configuration of political space, see Rovny and Edwards (2012).) 
Consider, for example, the spatial model presented in EU Profiler, developed for 
the elections for the European Parliament in 2010. As figure 2 shows, it presents users 
with a space with two axes: one called “socio-economic left-right”, and the other 
“pro-anti EU integration”. (It should be mentioned that EU Profiler also offers options 
to further analyze the result in the form of a list, as well as a spider diagram.) These 
dimensions are supposed to capture the structure of the political landscape in this 
context. The developers determine in advance to which dimension each issue belongs 
(“EU Profiler Description and Methodology” 2009). Consider what one might call a 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ view of what an election is about: on the one hand, one might 
include only issues on which the elected body (here: the European Parliament) has 
legal competence; on the other hand, one might include issues on which it does not 
formally have competence, but which are nonetheless discussed in the electoral 
campaign.11 EU Profiler appears to have chosen an informal approach, by including 
issues on which the European Parliament has no or very little formal competence, but 
which did attract attention in the electoral campaigns, such as child care subsidies, 
euthanasia, and the extent and depth of European integration. Pro- and anti-EU 
integration issues, while important to many of the parties running for the EP, typically 
are an intergovernmental affair outside the scope of powers of the parliament (Mair 
2007, 61). By endorsing this particular representation of the dimensional structure of 
political competition, the developers are taking a stance at a general level on what 
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matters in the election. In this case, they have chosen to present what some of the 
parties say is at stake in the election, not what from a legal perspective the election is 
about. By giving this dimension prominence in the VAA-result, they implicitly 
recommend that users take these issues into consideration when going to the ballot 
box.  
The important point for our purposes is that even if the dimensions chosen by the 
developers reflect significant correlations on an aggregate level among the opinions or 
behavior of voters and parties, this empirical fact would not be enough to justify their 
pertinence in providing voting advice. This is because such correspondence does not 
show that users have a good reason of their own to take these dimensions into account. 
For the purposes of voting advice, the dimensional structure of political space is  a 
normative and political issue, not a purely epistemic one.  
In short, our analysis of the presentation of VAA-results shows that whether a 
VAA uses a spatial model or a list, the developers do at least implicitly take a stance 
on what the salient issues or dimensions of competition are. A VAA does not simply 
reflect what is at stake in the election, neutrally passing along information. Rather, it 
structures the information in a way that is informed by the developers’ picture of 
politics. This means that VAA-developers have an active hand in staging electoral 




The upshot of our analysis is that scientific expertise cannot fully resolve what we 
have called the problem of representation—the complex relation between the picture 
of what is at stake in an election presented by a VAA to its user, and the actual reality 
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of electoral politics. The elements brought together in the foreground of a VAA (user 
preferences, party positions, etc.) do not belong together in virtue of the inherent 
structure of the world of electoral politics. They belong together in virtue of a 
particular interpretation of the political world, a ‘picture of politics’ that the 
developers presuppose. That what’s at stake in an election are one’s policy-
preferences, and that one’s distance from parties is to be understood in terms of 
agreement about proposed policies, is not an objective fact about the political world 
as such. The problem of representation in VAAs is not a merely epistemic, but a 
political problem.  
We are likely to miss these political aspects of VAA construction if we interpret 
the VAA as a mirror of electoral politics. The mirror-interpretation suggests that 
making an adequate representation of what an election is about is a matter of 
perfecting and tweaking the instrument to ensure sufficient accuracy, avoiding 
distortion, getting the right angle, etc. The instrument itself (or its maker) does not 
appear to structure what appears within the image; the image is conceptualized as a 
reflection of the structure of the part of the world it is aimed at. We are thus 
encouraged to mistake the background picture of politics for a direct access to the 
‘reality’ itself. In a diorama, in contrast, the dimensionality is (re)constructed by the 
maker. In the act of presenting the viewer with the diorama, she is invited to endorse 
the conceptual background—the artistic vision, narrative, or picture of politics—in 
light of which the elements make sense (at least insofar as she takes it seriously).  
The implication for the present debate on VAAs is to foreground the importance of 
the articulation and justification of the conceptual and normative presuppositions of 
VAAs, in addition to the epistemic concerns that currently take center stage in the 
debate. Furthermore, if this analysis makes sense, then to treat the VAA as mirroring 
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what is at stake in the election is not just to misunderstand the VAA’s role in the 
electoral process. It may even have the effect of undercutting the VAA’s aim of 
enhancing voter competence. Insofar as a user (or a developer, for that matter) who is 
presented with the foreground of the application mistakes its representation of the 
political landscape for a reflection, the background picture of politics does not appear 
as such at all. In that case, he or she is encouraged to construe its political 
presuppositions as simply part of the nature of electoral reality. VAAs can enhance 
voter competence under a very specific aspect: that of the citizen’s voting in line with 
his or her preferences on particular issues. But VAAs may undermine voter 
competence insofar as the political judgments with regard to what the election is 
about, made in the background of the application, are hidden from view.  
One reaction to this could be: “Many VAA’s do have something to say about what 
they do or do not represent. And this is exactly what they need to do in order to help 
prevent this problem.” Indeed, many VAAs work with options for the user that help 
him or her fine-tune the application. Moreover, developers are working on a wider 
repertoire of VAAs, focused, for instance, on political style, or looking retrospectively 
at past performance, etc. What these options in a way enable the user to do is to 
change the background picture of politics at work in the application so that a new 
evaluation of the attractions of the parties in the election becomes possible. If they 
offer such options without explaining why, they implicitly acknowledge that a VAA 
always works against the background of a structuring yet politically controversial 
picture of politics. If they offer such options while indeed explaining that a VAA 
cannot help but to generate its advice under certain aspects and at the cost of the 




Alvarez, R. Michael, Ines Levin, Alexander H. Trechsel, and Kristjan Vassil. 2013. 
“Voting Advice Applications: How Useful and for Whom?” Journal of 
Information Technology & Politics 11(1): 82–101. 
Anderson, Joel, and Thomas Fossen. 2014. “Voting Advice Applications and Political 
Theory: Citizenship, Participation, and Representation.” In Matching Voters 
with Parties and Candidates: Voting Advice Applications in a Comparative 
Perspective, eds. Diego Garzia and Stefan Marschall. Colchester: ECPR Press, 
217–26. 
Ankersmit, Frank. 1997. Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and 
Value. Stanford University Press. 
Baka, Aphrodite, Lia Figgou, and Vasiliki Triga. 2012. “‘Neither Agree, nor 
Disagree’: A Critical Analysis of the Middle Answer Category in Voting 
Advice Applications.” International Journal of Electronic Governance 5(3): 
244–63. 
Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. 
London: Routledge. 
———. 2012. “The Dimensionality of Political Space: Epistemological and 
Methodological Considerations.” European Union Politics 13(2): 194–218. 
Bohman, James, and William Rehg. 1997. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on 
Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Van den Brink, Bert. 2012. “Pictures of Politics: Deliberative and Other Aspects of 
Democracy.” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 98(3): 396–410. 
Van Camp, Kirsten, Jonas Lefevere, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2014. “The Content and 
Formulation of Statements in Voting Advice Applications: A Comparative 
Analysis of 26 VAAs.” In Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: 
Voting Advice Applications in a Comparative Perspective, eds. Diego Garzia 
and Stefan Marschall. Colchester: ECPR Press, 11–31. 
Cedroni, Lorella, and Diego Garzia, eds. 2010. Voting Advice Applications in Europe: 
The State of the Art. Napoli: Scriptaweb. 
Dinas, Elias, Alexander H. Trechsel, and Kristjan Vassil. 2014. “A Look into the 
Mirror: Preferences, Representation and Electoral Participation.” Electoral 
Studies 36: 290–97. 
Elster, Jon. 1997. “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory.” 
In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James 
Bohman and William Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–33. 




“Eurodusnie Presenteert Stemijzer.” 2006. Indymedia NL. 
http://indymedia.nl/nl/2006/11/40313.shtml (September 12, 2011). 
Fivaz, Jan, and Giorgio Nadig. 2010. “Impact of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) 
on Voter Turnout and Their Potential Use for Civic Education.” Policy & 
Internet 2(4): 167. 
Fossen, Thomas, and Joel Anderson. 2014. “What’s the Point of Voting Advice 
Applications? Competing Perspectives on Democracy and Citizenship.” 
Electoral Studies 36: 244–51. 
Van Fraassen, Bas C. 2010. Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Garzia, Diego. 2010. “The Effects of VAAs on Users’ Voting Behaviour: An 
Overview.” In Voting Advice Applications in Europe: The State of the Art, eds. 
Lorella Cedroni and Diego Garzia. Napoli: Scriptaweb, 13–33. 
Garzia, Diego, and Stefan Marschall. 2012. “Voting Advice Applications Under 
Review: The State of Research.” International Journal of Electronic 
Governance 5(3-4): 203–22. 
———, eds. 2014. Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: Voting Advice 
Applications in a Comparative Perspective. Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Gemenis, Kostas. 2013. “Estimating Parties’ Policy Positions through Voting Advice 
Applications: Some Methodological Considerations.” Acta Politica 48(3): 
268–95. 
Gemenis, Kostas, and Martin Rosema. 2014. “Voting Advice Applications and 
Electoral Turnout.” Electoral Studies 36: 281–89. 
Golder, Matt, and Jacek Stramski. 2010. “Ideological Congruence and Electoral 
Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 54(1): 90–106. 
Goodin, Robert E. 2008. Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice 
After the Deliberative Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
De Graaf, Jochum, and Jerome Scheltens. 2011. “Stemwijzer Is Geen Wetenschap.” 
In Amsterdam. 
Ladner, Andreas, Gabriela Felder, and Jan Fivaz. 2010. “More than Toys? A First 
Assessment of Voting Advice Applications in Switzerland.” In Voting Advice 
Applications in Europe: The State of the Art, eds. Lorella Cedroni and Diego 
Garzia. Napoli: Scriptaweb, 91–124. 
Lefevere, Jonas, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2014. “A Perfect Match? The Impact of 
Statement Selection on Voting Advice Applications’ Ability to Match Voters 
and Parties.” Electoral Studies 36: 252–62. 
	 26 
Louwerse, Tom, and Martin Rosema. 2014. “The Design Effects of Voting Advice 
Applications: Comparing Methods of Calculating Matches.” Acta Politica 
49(3): 286–312. 
Mair, Peter. 2007. “Political Opposition and the European Union.” Government and 
Opposition 42(1): 1–17. 
Marschall, Stefan. 2008. “The Online Making of Citizens: Wahl-O-Mat.” In The 
Making of Citizens in Europe: New Perspectives on Citizenship Education, ed. 
Viola B. Georgi. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 137–41. 
Marschall, Stefan, and Christian K. Schmidt. 2010. “The Impact of Voting Indicators: 
The Case of the German Wahl-O-Mat.” In Voting Advice Applications in 
Europe: The State of the Art, eds. Lorella Cedroni and Diego Garzia. Napoli: 
Scriptaweb, 65–90. 
Mendez, Fernando. 2012a. “Matching Voters with Political Parties and Candidates: 
An Empirical Test of Four Algorithms.” International Journal of Electronic 
Governance 5(3-4): 264–78. 
———. 2012b. “Why We Don’t Give Voting Recommendations.” Choose4Greece. 
http://www.choose4greece.com/wordpress/?p=67 (November 25, 2012). 
Mendez, Fernando, and Jonathan Wheatley. 2014. “Using VAA-Generated Data for 
Mapping Partisan Supporters in the Ideological Space.” In Matching Voters 
with Parties and Candidates: Voting Advice Applications in a Comparative 
Perspective, eds. Diego Garzia and Stefan Marschall. Colchester: ECPR Press, 
161–73. 
Näsström, Sofia. 2006. “Representative Democracy as Tautology.” European Journal 
of Political Theory 5(3): 321–42. 
Nuytemans, Michiel, Stefaan Walgrave, and Kris Deschouwer. 2010. “Do the Vote 
Test: The Belgian Voting Aid Application.” In Voting Advice Applications in 
Europe: The State of the Art, eds. Lorella Cedroni and Diego Garzia. Napoli: 
Scriptaweb. 
Otjes, Simon, and Tom Louwerse. 2014. “Spatial Models in Voting Advice 
Applications.” Electoral Studies 36: 263–71. 
Peirce, C.S. 1902. “Virtual.” Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/virtual.html (October 8, 2011). 
Rosema, Martin, Joel Anderson, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2014. “The Design, Purpose, 
and Effects of Voting Advice Applications.” Electoral Studies 36: 240–43. 
Rovny, Jan, and Erica E. Edwards. 2012. “Struggle Over Dimensionality: Party 
Competition in Western and Eastern Europe.” East European Politics and 
Societies 26(1): 56–74. 
Schofield, Norman. 2008. The Spatial Model of Politics. London: Routledge. 
	 27 
Trechsel, Alexander H., and Peter Mair. 2011. “When Parties (also) Position 
Themselves: An Introduction to the EU Profiler.” Journal of Information 
Technology & Politics 8(1): 1–20. 
Triga, Vasiliki. 2014. “Social Representations of Voting Advice Applications: A 
Comparative Analysis.” In Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: 
Voting Advice Applications in a Comparative Perspective, eds. Diego Garzia 
and Stefan Marschall. Colchester: ECPR Press, 129–43. 
Wagner, Markus, and Outi Ruusuvirta. 2012. “Matching Voters to Parties: Voting 
Advice Applications and Models of Party Choice.” Acta Politica 47(4): 400–
422. 
Walgrave, Stefaan, Peter van Aelst, and Michiel Nuytemans. 2008. “Do the Vote 
Test: The Electoral Effects of a Popular Vote Advice Application at the 2004 
Belgian Elections.” Acta Politica 43: 50–70. 
Walgrave, Stefaan, Michiel Nuytemans, and Koen Pepermans. 2009. “Voting Aid 
Applications and the Effect of Statement Selection.” West European Politics 
32(6): 1161–80. 
Wall, Matthew, André Krouwel, and Thomas Vitiello. 2014. “Do Voters Follow the 
Recommendations of Voter Advice Application Websites? A Study of the 
Effects of Kieskompas.nl on Its Users’ Vote Choices in the 2010 Dutch 




 Figure 1: Statement screen from EU Profiler 2009 
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Figure 2: Result screen from EU Profiler 2009 (German parties) 
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1 There are several useful overviews of the literature available (Cedroni and Garzia 
2010; Garzia and Marschall 2012, 2014; Rosema, Anderson, and Walgrave 2014).  
2 In asking how VAAs should be interpreted, our approach differs from empirical 
studies of how VAAs are in fact perceived and interpreted by their users (e.g. Alvarez 
et al. 2013; Triga 2014).  
3 For a discussion of the sense of “representation” in relation to VAAs, see (Anderson 
and Fossen 2014, 223–225). The political significance of the aesthetic sense of 
representation is highlighted in the work of political thinkers such as Frank Ankersmit, 
Cornelius Castoriadis, and Claude Lefort (e.g. Ankersmit 1997; Näsström 2006).  
Outside the political context, Van Fraassen (2010) provides a helpful discussion of 
representation as picturing.  
4 This is not to deny that developers may also have other motives for developing a 
VAA: in addition to improving the electoral process, they may have commercial 
purposes, or may want to gather research data. But such motives are not usually 
appealed to when justifying the existence of VAAs.		
5 It is not clear to us exactly what difference it makes whether the result is said to be 
“advice” or merely an “aid”; either way the user is presented with information that is 
supposedly pertinent to his or her voting decision. Nuytemans, Walgrave, and 
Deschouwer (2010, 126) seem to suggest that when a VAA purports to give advice, it 
bypasses the voter’s own judgment. But it seems to us that an adviser does not 
normally impose a judgment on the advisee that is to be followed “blindly”; rather she 
helps him to see some of the reasons relevant to a particular decision. So we do not 
think VAA-developers need to refrain from calling the result “advice”. 
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6 VAAs that use a mix of modes of presentation include, for example, EU Profiler 
(EU), Smartvote (Switzerland) and Vote Compass (developed for various countries, 
sometimes with a two-dimensional model, and sometimes with multiple models); 
VAAs that exclusively use lists include Wahl-O-Mat (Germany); Doe de Stemtest 
(Belgium), and StemWijzer (The Netherlands).  
7 Some form of measurement is still required, of course, to procure information about 
user preferences and party positions.  
8 Louwerse and Rosema suggest that list-based results are also based on spatial 
models, but with a much higher number of dimensions (Louwerse and Rosema 2014). 
This makes sense from a computational perspective, but it ignores the conceptual 
distinction between the different meanings they communicate. 
9 Two basic approaches to specifying the number and content of dimensions of 
contestation are distinguished in the literature on spatial models (Benoit and Laver 
2012). Given a dataset of preferences of political actors on a range of issues, these 
actors can be positioned in a unified space based on correlations found in the data (ex 
post), or based on a prior understanding of the relevant dimensions, derived from 
theory or previous data-analyses (ex ante). For VAAs, an ex post-approach is 
unavailable, however, if only because in a VAA the ‘data’ (user input) is not available 
in advance; the developers therefore must have some prior knowledge of the 
dimensional structure of political competition. Of course this is not to deny that VAA-
generated data can be used also to construct ex-post spatial models (Mendez and 
Wheatley 2014).  
10 There is no consensus among political scientists on the number and content of the 
dimensions of political contestation in many electoral contexts, and it is often 
	 33 
																																																																																																																																																														
emphasized that there is no single right dimensional model of a particular context 
(Benoit and Laver 2006, 110).  
11 We thank Tom Louwerse and Simon Otjes for drawing our attention to this 
distinction. 
